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Abstract— Autonomous aerial surveillance using drone feed 
is an interesting and challenging research domain. To ensure 
safety from intruders and potential objects posing threats to the 
zone being protected, it is crucial to be able to distinguish 
between normal and abnormal states in real-time. Additionally, 
we also need to consider any device malfunction. However, the 
inherent uncertainty embedded within the type and level of 
abnormality makes supervised techniques less suitable since the 
adversary may present a unique anomaly for intrusion. As a 
result, an unsupervised method for anomaly detection is 
preferable taking the unpredictable nature of attacks into 
account. Again in our case, the autonomous drone provides 
heterogeneous data streams consisting of images and other 
analog or digital sensor data, all of which can play a role in 
anomaly detection if they are ensembled synergistically. To that 
end, an ensemble detection mechanism is proposed here which 
estimates the degree of abnormality of analyzing the real-time 
image and IMU (Inertial Measurement Unit) sensor data in an 
unsupervised manner. First, we have implemented a 
Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) regression block, named 
AngleNet to estimate the angle between a reference image and 
current test image, which provides us with a measure of the 
anomaly of the device. Moreover, the IMU data are used in 
autoencoders to predict abnormality. Finally, the results from 
these two pipelines are ensembled to estimate the final degree of 
abnormality. Furthermore, we have applied adversarial attack 
to test the robustness and security of the proposed approach and 
integrated defense mechanism. The proposed method performs 
satisfactorily on the IEEE SP Cup-2020 dataset with an 
accuracy of 97.8%. Additionally, we have also tested this 
approach on an in-house dataset to validate its robustness. 
Keywords— Unsupervised anomaly detection, AngleNet, 
Adversarial attack, IMU, Drone image, Auto-encoder 
I. INTRODUCTION  
Machine learning (ML) techniques have had far reaching 
impacts in diverse arenas ranging from image classification 
[1], assistive technologies [2-6], sensing [7-8] to heart rate 
measurement [9-10].   With the proliferation of automation, 
security has become an important issue for these technologies 
to detect and control malevolent activities. In this respect, 
autonomous surveillance is of particular interest due to its 
capability of continuous monitoring. In order to ensure safety 
of the perimeter that is under consideration, the autonomous 
agent must detect abnormalities using images and other 
available sensory data [11]. However, designing an effective 
system for such online detection tasks in resource-constrained 
autonomous bodies is challenging. Firstly, the type of 
anomaly might vary from previous scenarios encountered as 
the adversary has the degree of freedom for coming up with 
newer anomalies. Moreover, the moving drone has to perform 
detection in real-time with low latency and high accuracy 
since too many false positives will be expensive and false 
negatives might cause security breaches. Keeping these in 
mind, incorporating deep learning methods for anomaly 
detection seems attractive. Although supervised models give 
very high accuracy in general for detection purposes, we 
require a-priori information about all possible attack cases for 
these models to succeed, which may be an impractical 
assumption considering the possibility of novel abnormalities. 
Moreover, no matter how well the pipeline is designed, an 
attacker can fool the system using various adversarial attacks 
on the ML models [12]. So, for an effective and secure 
anomaly detection system, the defender must take into 
account the potential of such adversaries and take 
precautionary measures.  
There have been extensive studies on anomaly detection 
using autonomous systems leveraging a wide variety of 
techniques. Campo et al. [13] proposed a Gaussian process 
(GP) regression method to detect abnormal motions in real 
vehicle situations based on trajectory data. A novel method 
based on internal cross-correlation parameters of the vehicle 
with Dynamic Bayesian Network (DBN) was implemented to 
determine the abnormal behavior in [14].  The authors in [15] 
utilized a method of selecting an appropriate network size for 
detecting abnormalities in multisensory data fed from a 
semiautonomous vehicle. Many of the previous works mostly 
attempt to learn private layer (PL) self-awareness models 
based on a high level of supervision [16-17].  On the contrary, 
Ravanbakhsh et al. [18] proposed a dynamic incremental self-
awareness (SA) model which learns through experiences in a 
hierarchical manner, growing in complexity from simple to 
more structured cases. They used cross-modal Generative 
Adversarial Networks (GAN) to make usage of image data. 
Again, Baydoun et al. [19] also adopted a similar approach of 
training a set of GANs in a semi-supervised fashion to perform 
multi-sensor anomaly detection. It was implemented for 
moving cognitive agents using both external and private first-
person visual observations to characterize agents' motion in a 
given environment. Notably, the only focus of most of these 
works lies in environmental anomaly detection. While this is 
an important and demanding task itself, another pertinent issue 
is the operating condition of the surveillance agent. Even if the 
detection system operates faithfully, the whole pipeline will 
be hampered greatly if the data collecting device is suffering 
from anomaly. However, the monitoring of device anomaly 
has usually not been taken into consideration in the literature. 
Recognizing this gap, the IEEE SP CUP 2020 competition 
[20] pivots on autonomous device anomaly detection in a 
surveillance setting and this is the problem we try to focus on 
in this paper. Another pivotal issue of modern ML based 
system’s vulnerability is adversarial attacks on the learnt 
models. Interestingly, none of the previous works consider the 
failure cases that may arise due to such attack cases. Without 
a thorough investigation of the resistance of these models to 
some of these adversarial perturbations, it is unfair to claim 
their success against malicious anomalies. 
To address the above mentioned critical issues in 
autonomous anomaly detection, in this paper, we introduce a 
modification of Siamese Network [21] consisting of 
Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) based regression 
architecture namely AngleNet which estimates angular 
displacement between two images. Additionally, our 
proposed method uses an autoencoder based anomaly 
detection system from the Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU) 
data available from the drone. Finally, an ensemble 
mechanism is utilized to estimate the degree of abnormality 
using predictions both from the given image and IMU data 
samples at a particular timestamp. 
The main contributions of this paper are: 
1. We have implemented an ensemble of 
multimodal data (image and sensory motion data) 
for accurate, low-latency device anomaly 
detection in real-time for autonomous 
surveillance. 
2. To ensure an effective and secure anomaly 
detection system, we have taken into account the 
potential of adversarial attacks and integrated 
adversarial training as a defense mechanism to 
further strengthen this system. 
The organization of the rest of the paper is as follows. 
Section II explains the details of the problem description. 
Section III describes the proposed method where the 
AngleNet and the rest of the clustering methods are explained 
in detail. Section IV presents the experimental results and 
comparison and finally, the work is concluded with section V. 
II. PROBLEM AND DATASET DESCRIPTION 
In SP Cup 2020 [20] competition dataset, Rosbag files were 
provided which contained data from IMU sensor and images 
of respective time frames. Some files had normal time frames 
only, while other files contained both normal and abnormal 
time frames which are mixed. The task was to find the 
abnormal time frames using unsupervised methods. Usage of 
only the normal data was allowed during training. This 
essentially means we are unaware of the exact type and level 
of abnormal situation beforehand. As a result, we had to 
perform training and other calculations solely on normal data 
and using it we had to find the abnormal cases. Total 12 
Rosbag files were given where the total number of normal 
images is 277 and the number of mixed images is 392. 
 
Figure 1: Example of image samples, (a) normal state, (b) abnormal 
state with the object and (c) abnormal state without the object 
 
 
Figure 2: Normal and abnormal samples for 100 seconds from 
IMU/data and IMU/mag 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Schematic illustration of the proposed method for estimating degree of abnormality
 Figure 4: AngleNet used for estimation of angle difference between two images 
 
Besides image data, IMU sensor data were provided. 
There are 6 types of data under IMU topicname among which 
we have used IMU/data and IMU/mag. A total of 987 normal 
timestamps was provided. IMU/data contains the orientation 
and velocity information of the drone along 3 axes and 
IMU/mag contains magnetic field data read by magnetometer. 
There are two separate parts in this detection procedure, image 
analysis and IMU sensor data analysis. We used an 
autoencoder based anomaly detection system for IMU data 
and used AngleNet to estimate the angle of an input image 
with respect to a normal reference image sample and later 
ensembled the 3 outputs to estimate the degree of abnormality. 
Figure 1 shows some normal and abnormal image samples 
provided in this dataset and it is very clear that the angle of 
view is changed significantly between the two cases. In this 
paper, we have considered two types of anomalies for images 
according to the figure. One is angle difference with normal 
image and the other is the absence of the object which is being 
followed by the drone. Moreover, to detect abnormal 
timestamps from IMU sensor data, there must be some 
distinctive factors between normal and abnormal IMU data 
which is demonstrated in Figure 2. Angular velocity and 
reading of magnetic field for 100 normal and abnormal 
samples along x-axis are presented in this figure. The variance 
of the data for the abnormal cases is quite clearly much larger 
in a time window compared to normal samples. These 
observations lead us to designing our proposed detection 
scheme which is described next. 
 
III. PROPOSED METHOD 
 This section describes the method we have used to develop 
an unsupervised model to detect abnormalities using the 
image and IMU sensor data. When the abnormal images were 
taken, the drone due to some malfunction became rotated at a 
significant angle. To accurately estimate the angle without 
depending on the abnormal data, we have introduced 
AngleNet which is used in an unsupervised manner. Besides 
we have used autoencoder based algorithm for modeling 
normal IMU data. Figure 3 demonstrates how we have 
combined the three outputs altogether to estimate the degree 
of anomaly. As per the figure, rather than using the outputs of 
the models directly, we have integrated weights manually and 
estimated the final degree of anomaly. The intuition is, 
AngleNet can only estimate the angle, not measure it precisely 
and for a single timestamp, the rotation of the drone may be 
slightly higher than the threshold angle but the sensor data 
may be significantly anomalous. Also, it can happen vice 
versa. So it is appropriate to use weights to combine them 
fruitfully and these are discussed further in Section IV. The 
different blocks of the proposed approach are described next 
in detail. 
A. AngleNet 
In the abnormal state of a surveillance drone, it is mostly 
the tilt angle that varies from the normal state as depicted in 
Fig. 2. In normal conditions, the drone is pretty stable as 
shown in the dataset. While for the unstable drone, the image 
is tilted at a significant angle. Inspired by Siamese network 
[21] we introduce AngleNet, a convolutional neural network 
based regression architecture to estimate significant angle 
change from the normal state. Previously Spyros et al. [22] 
introduced RotNet but we cannot use this model in this case 
as it works in a classification manner and can only detect 
angles among 0, 90, 180, 270 degrees. But in AngleNet, we 
tried to demonstrated angle estimation as a regression problem 
to have a more precise estimation of the degree of anomaly. In 
this model, a normal image should be provided first, and then 
the upcoming frames will be taken as input and the output is 
the angle between them. If there is a significant difference 
between the images such as object mismatch, the output will 
be significantly high which is why [23] or other classical 
computer vision-based angle estimation systems are not 
suitable for our application. In Figure 4, we see the model 
structure where it takes two images at a size of 64x64 pixels 
and after passing through several convolutional (Conv) blocks 
followed by maxpooling for each image branch, the 
activations are concatenated. This output is then processed by 
another Conv block and finally two fully connected hidden 
layers to produce the final angle estimation. On the layers, 
m@axb means a tensor having a depth of m channels and 
height and width of a rows and b columns respectively. 
 
As discussed in section II, our goal is to design an 
unsupervised scenario, the images from the abnormal cases 
are not available during training. As a result, we have not 
trained AngleNet in a supervised manner using the specific 
application data. To train this model alternatively in this case, 
we have used the Stanford car dataset [24] to pre-train. The 
images were first augmented as so it can mimic the angle 
change, as demonstrated in Figure 5. The activation function 
of the final layer was ReLU, a non-negative linear function. 
Finally, there were 48,000 images which were divided into 
80% train image and 20% validation image. Mean Squared 
Error was used as the loss function. 
 
 
Figure 5: Samples of normal images and augmented images 
from Stanford Car Dataset [24] 
After pre-training the model using the dataset, we have 
fine-tuned using the provided dataset [20] to estimate the 
degree of abnormality σd of the images by dividing the output 
angle by 90.0 degrees. The performance of the model on 
classifying normal images is demonstrated in Section IV. 
 
B. Autoencoder based AD of IMU data 
For both the IMU/data and IMU/mag, we have used 
autoencoder based anomaly detection system, similar to [25] 
but not exactly. The autoencoder models used here are shown 
in Figure 6. While training the autoencoders, it is supposed 
that in an abnormal time frame, both IMU/mag and IMU/data 
reading are abnormal. As there is no clear description of the 
dataset on this issue, we have considered as such and it 
produced a good result in our practical experimentation which 
is described in Section IV-F. As we are considering both are 
abnormal or normal at the same time frame, we have trained 
two autoencoders together.  In this case, mean squared error 
(MSE) was considered as reconstruction loss. If L1 is the MSE 
for IMU/data sample and L2 is mse for IMU/mag sample, 
then: 
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1
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2𝑛
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𝑛
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                  (2) 
where yk and ŷk are ground truth and reconstructed output 
respectively for IMU/data samples. And yi and ŷi are ground 
truth and reconstructed output for IMU/mag samples. The 
training loss is defined by the linear addition of the two losses, 
L1+L2. While training these two autoencoders, we have used 
normal samples only as we have discussed earlier. The results 
are discussed in Section IV.  
 
 
Figure 6: Autoencoder architecture used for IMU/data and 
IMU/mag 
To find the degree of anomaly in this manner we had to 
consider Lmax, data and Lmax, mag as maximum reconstruction 
errors from the reconstruction errors of all individual samples 
from IMU/data and IMU/mag respectively. And calculated σd, 
σm using (3) and (4). 
                              𝜎𝑑 =
𝐿1
𝐿𝑚𝑎𝑥,𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎
                                (3) 
                              𝜎𝑚 =
𝐿1
𝐿𝑚𝑎𝑥,𝑚𝑎𝑔
                                (4) 
 
C. Ensuring Adversarial Defense 
As we are dealing with images delivered from the dataset, 
there is a possibility of being attacked by adversarial samples 
which will hamper the model to take decisions and bypass the 
pipeline. Although using original images as input has shown 
fair results, applying generated adversarial samples has 
caused significant performance degradation of our system 
which indicates the vulnerability that is further discussed in 
section IV-D.  
  
 
Original 
Image 
   
 
FGSM 
   
PGD 
   
 
Figure 7: Original images and corresponding adversarial images 
 
Then we perform adversarial training [26] as defense by 
training our model again with both the original images and 
generated adversarial images and achieved considerable 
accuracy. We have experimented using Projected Gradient 
Descent (PGD) and Fast-gradient-sign method (FGSM) 
attacks. For this kind of image, the PGD attack seems more 
suitable if we analyze the images of Figure 7. 
IV. EXPERIMENT AND RESULT 
In this section, we have discussed the training procedures 
and results on the IEEE SP Cup 2020 dataset [20]. As this 
dataset is novel and contains two types of data, we have 
discussed the results separately and lastly, we have 
ensembled the results and produced the final output. Also, the 
performance of two types of adversarial attacks and defense 
are discussed.  
A. IMU Anomaly Detection 
As discussed in Section II, we have used the autoencoder 
based anomaly detection system for IMU data.  The results 
are discussed in Table 1. Normalization improves 
performance for IMU/mag as it has a wide range of data, from  
TABLE 1. PERFORMANCE ON IMU DATA 
Data Accuracy F-1 Score False 
Negative 
IMU/data 96.8% 0.9812 2 
IMU/mag 100% 0.95 0 
 
(-400000, 400000), it’s very tough to converge the loss 
without normalization. As discussed in [27], the authors have 
claimed slightly better accuracy than us on the same dataset 
but their system is resources expensive. We are using two tiny 
autoencoders as shown in Figure 6 with a shared loss for IMU 
anomaly detection which can be run on common embedded 
devices of a low resource like Raspberry pi, which is 
validated in subsection G. Even though the accuracy reported 
in [27] excels ours, we can run our system in much lower 
resource-budget having very few or no false-negative cases. 
While accuracy is an important metric, we also need to 
compare false positive and false negatives to provide a fairer 
comparison. The F-1 score and false negative ratio is given in 
Table 1, which show satisfactory performance. The 
comparison among some other popular algorithms is given in 
Table 2. Notably, the proposed algorithm in this paper was 
among the top 10 performing submissions in IEEE SP Cup 
2020. 
 
TABLE 2: COMPARISONS WITH OTHER ALGORITHMS 
Algorithm Accuracy 
Autoencoder, Rad et. al. 
[28] 
96.87% 
 Kmeans Clustering, Iqbal 
et. al. [15] 
93.28% 
1D CNN, Kiranyaz et. al. 
[29] 
89.9% 
PCA and Kmeans of IMU 82.3% 
Spectral Clustering of IMU 91.7% 
Clustering of IMU with 
image classification [30] 
97.3% 
This paper 97.8% 
 
 
B. AngleNet Based Anomaly Detection 
Using AngleNet, we can estimate the angle between the 
test image and the normal image. In the abnormal images, the 
rotation angle is the main distinctive factor. Any images 
rotated by 30 degrees is supposed to be abnormal. But the 
threshold is perfectly tunable and user-defined. The 
performance of AngleNet on the test images is shown in 
Table 3. 
 
TABLE 3. PERFORMANCE OF ANGLENET ON NORMAL IMAGE 
Threshold 
Angle 
Accuracy 
30 94.7% 
20 86.4% 
 
The state-of-the-art image/video novelty detection algorithms 
is mostly for environmental anomaly detection which is not 
perfectly inclined with the problem we have worked with. We 
are more interested to find the anomaly of the device rather 
than the environment. Some comparisons with various 
methods are shown in Table 4. 
 
 
 
TABLE 4: COMPARISON OF ANOMALY DETECTION USING 
IMAGE 
Algorithm Accuracy 
AngleNet 94.7% 
 Optical flow supervised  89.4% 
Optical flow, unsupervised 92.33% 
Binary Classification 84.85% 
Spectral Clustering 91.7% 
 
The angle is not only the difference between normal and 
abnormal image samples but also there are some motion 
factors. So, we have compared the performance of anomaly 
detection between using optical flow of normal and actual 
images. In the dataset, the provided images were sampled so 
they did not have a gradual movement shift among them, 
rather there is a rapid difference in motion and content, so 
optical flow did not perform so well in this case. 
C. Ensembling Models 
The process is designed so that both the clustering-based 
anomaly detection and AngleNet can be used separately or in 
an ensemble manner. As we have discussed, we calculate the 
degree of abnormality in each case, ensembling them can 
produce a combined result. Proposed ensembling formula is 
given as- 
 
 
𝑁 = 𝑤𝑑 ∗ 𝜎𝑑 + 𝑤𝑚 ∗ 𝜎𝑚 + 𝑤𝐼 ∗ 𝜎𝐼           (5) 
 
where N is the combined degree of abnormality, wd , wm, wI 
represents the weights for three different models such as two 
autoencoder-based models and one Convolutional Neural 
Network-based model, AngleNet. And σd, σm, σI represent the 
degree of abnormality for IMU/data, IMU/mag, and Image 
respectively. After ensembling those models, we have 
achieved an overall 97.8% accuracy with an F-1 score of 0.98. 
To find the 3 weights, first, we considered 1 for each of them 
primarily and performed extensive experiments to empirically 
determine the values of the weights. Our investigation finds 
wI = 0.75, wm = 0.9 and  wd = 1 provides the best results and 
these values were chosen for subsequent analysis. We 
considered a timestamp to be abnormal if N ≥ 1. 
D. Adversarial Defense 
As discussed in Section III, we have used FGSM and 
PGD to generate adversarial samples for our model which can 
confuse the model. We used the Cleverhans library to 
generate the attacks. For FGSM, we used an 𝑙∞ attack with 
𝜖 = 0.25. For the PGD attack, a similar 𝜖 was used for 20 
iterations. In both cases, images were clipped to [0, 1]. The 
adversarial attack accuracy is shown in Table 5. As indicated, 
our model has performed rather poorly on adversarial 
samples, especially for PGD. We have tested both optical 
flow and original images for generating adversarial samples. 
The intuition behind using optical flow was, such a scenario 
can easily be generated so the optical flow is similar to any 
adversarial optical flow, rather than generating original 
adversarial scenarios for the drone camera.  
 
TABLE 5: PERFORMANCE ON ADVERSARIAL SAMPLES 
Input Type Algorithm Attack 
Accuracy 
Defense 
Accuracy 
Original 
Image 
FGSM 64% 89.9% 
PGD 4% 92.3% 
Optical 
Flow 
FGSM 47.7% 84.5% 
PGD 9.89% 73.46% 
 
It’s clear that our adversarial defense system is more 
vulnerable to optical flow inputs. Also, practically it is more 
difficult to create adversarial optical flow than adversarial 
input image samples. Interestingly, these adversarial 
perturbations are usually added after the clean image has been 
captured. Since our drone camera is taking the images and 
processing it on the fly, a natural query might be about the 
nature of successfully accomplishing such fishing attacks. In 
this respect, we consider two separate scenarios. The most 
prominent and direct form of attack could be physical attacks 
on the ML detection system. It has been shown that 
adversarial attack can be performed by placing intentional 
objects which fool the system [31] like adversarial turtle or 
using adversarial patches [32]. While it is difficult to model 
all possible cases regarding this type of attack, we generated 
5 types of patches and trained our model putting these patches 
at various places around the perimeter that the drone is 
moving around. The results are shown in Table 6, row 1 
which shown the training is quite successful in regaining the 
accuracy. The other form of attack could be possible through 
network intrusion if the classification is performed on the 
cloud. In this case, due to resource-constraints, it may not be 
possible to process the collected data on the autonomous 
agent itself, so data is transmitted to a remote server and 
detection is performed there. For such cases, if the adversary 
intrudes our network and corrupts the transmitted data, then 
it may cause wrong detections. Considering this scenario, 
there could be two possible cases. First is the data dependent 
adversarial perturbations are added each image or sensor data 
separately like FGSM or PGD attacks. This is the case 
considered as discussed above in Table 5. However, 
calculating such data-dependent adversarial noise takes time 
 
TABLE 6: PERFORMANCE AGAINST DIFFERENT 
ADVERSARIAL ATTACK SCHEMES 
 
Attack Scheme Attack 
Accuracy 
Defense 
Accuracy 
Physical 
Attack [32] 
4% 84.6% 
UAP [33] 24% 91.5% 
NAG [34] 14.7% 87.4% 
 
which in attack cases during real-time transmission may not 
be feasible, especially with no direct access to the data for the 
adversary. We believe a more realistic threat model in this 
case will be image-agnostic perturbations like the universal 
adversarial perturbations (UAP) [33]. These can be pre-
computed and are common noise added to every image, as a 
result could potentially be added to the gathered data by the 
drone provided that the attacker has been able to perform 
network intrusion. To counter such probable attacks, we 
compute some UAPs for our training images (both normal as 
well as abnormal) and perform adversarial training by 
augmenting the dataset with these images. Again, the system 
is now able to withstand such attack quite well as depicted in 
row 2 of Table 6. Finally, another form of attack could be 
through modeling the distribution of the training data 
manifold and using generative models to create perturbations 
[34]. Although such attacks are quite unlikely to occur in real-
life cases, as a precautionary measure, we also generate such 
images and augment our training. Notably, even if the 
adversaries are unlikely for this specific application, we 
anticipate such data augmentation to be helpful in better 
generalization of our model. 
 
E. Computational Cost  
While training AngleNet on the Car dataset, we have used 
GoogleColab with Nvidia Tesla K80 GPU with 12 Gigabytes 
of memory. But for the testing purpose, it runs on a computer 
with 2 Gigabytes of GPU seamlessly. The system is tested on 
a system containing the Intel Core i5 processor, 8 Gigabytes 
of RAM and Nvidia 940 MX. It takes 0.47 seconds on an 
average to process a single frame. 
 
F. Implementation on In-house setup 
For demonstration of real-time usage on an embedded 
device and verifying robustness, we deployed our proposed 
method on a raspberry pi where the autoencoders ran on the 
pi and CNN based processing works on a remote server. The 
system was tested on in-house setup, with custom hexacopter 
running on Ardupilot and we used raspberry pi 3 for real-time 
processing and sending video frames to the server. In this 
setup, the accuracy of the algorithm turned out to be 93.69%. 
This proves that the system is able to adapt to different test 
conditions and perform satisfactorily in real-time. 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
In this paper, we have demonstrated an ensembled 
approach for unmanned vehicle anomaly detection. Our 
approach does not classify any sample strictly normal or 
abnormal, rather we have used the degree of abnormality as a 
metric for prediction. The lower the value, the closer it is to 
normal situation. We have introduced AngleNet which is 
used to estimate angles between two input images and using 
this angle we can determine anomaly. We have trained 
AngleNet on the Stanford Car Dataset and used transfer 
learning to estimate the angle of the images of the SP Cup 
dataset. For detecting abnormal IMU samples, we have used 
an autoencoder based anomaly detection system. Along with 
maintaining good accuracy, we have integrated defense 
mechanisms from adversarial attacks which is a potential 
threat to our algorithm. Again, this algorithm performs 
robustly in real-time for an in-house dataset as well. Future 
work includes incorporating both device and environmental 
anomaly detection in a single scheme for a comprehensive 
analysis of surveillance systems. 
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